Introduction
The word 'city' comes from the Latin cīvitās, meaning a highly organized communitysomething that has existed almost as long as human history. 2 In the context of Ontario, Canada, the word 'city' is undefined in statutory terms: the most recent set of municipal statutes removed references to titles like 'city,' 'town,' and 'village.' 3 Generally, cities are nested within the jurisdiction of provincial, state, or federal governments that limit their authority, and are also understood as democratic governments that represent their residents. 4 In addition to city councils that serve as the legislatures of decision-making, residents and businesses are also represented by associations that seek a decision-making role in local matters. One example is a Business where multiple bodies claim to have rights to govern within an urban context, how such claims are mediated, and by whom. 
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This paper explores the tensions between conceptualizing BIDs as a tool for collaborative justice or, alternatively, as an exclusive interest group that is privileged within urban governance. The aim is not to set out a grand, generalized theory of BIDs and their place within the governance of cities, but rather to understand whether and how BIDs can be considered an example of the urban commons. It begins by summarizing the existing literature on the scope and meaning of the 'urban commons,' including as a form of property interest and a political movement. What do we mean by the governance of the 'urban commons,' and how do BIDs fit into this scheme? Next, it 10 This is a different conception of the urban commons from Harvey (DATE), for example, who suggests that spaces become urban commons through social action. uses examples from the city of Toronto, the first municipality to introduce BIDs as a form of local representation, to explore the existing legal framework of BIDs. Can they can be considered a form of urban commons? Specifically, it explores how an analysis that focuses on decision-making, representation, and accountability as elements of just urban governance can serve as the basis of an evaluation of the urban commons This paper also applies normative characteristics to evaluate claims about the commons. Can the language of the 'urban commons' be used to understand BIDs, or does Foster and Iaione's call for "visible, equal, contestable, and legitimate" decision-making render this characterization theoretically problematic? How is the language of the urban commons used in overlapping claims in city governance? By exploring these issues, this paper helps clarify how dominant groups leverage and rely on state power to further their economic interests. 18 These factors were later used in evaluating the commons as applied to cities.
Conceptualizing the Urban Commons
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The commons and the city A discussion of an urban commons first requires situating the city. Saskia Sassen described the large, complex city as "a new frontier zone." 20 She wrote, "Access to the city is no longer simply a matter of having or not having power. Urban spaces have become hybrid bases from which to act" through robust governance structures. 21 Legal authority and governance structures are critical to action. 22 As Canadian legal scholar Hoi Kong wrote, "Cities can be many things, but they are necessarily creations of the law." 23 Law is key to governance, in that it shapes the microspaces and bodies within the complex city that play a role in local and city-wide decisionmaking. 24 The law serves a critical role in empowering people and communities within an urban space to engage and act. According to Foster and Iaione's urban commons framework, regardless of whether spaces are privately or publicly owned, the city is a territorial space in which citizens have a role or stake, a norm which is reinforced in law. 39 They built on Ostrom's argument, which challenged the assumption that common property cannot be governed collectively without substantial waste and inefficiency to the urban form. In the context of the city, common pool resources are particular urban spaces, which then become sites of governance. Public-private organizations can work together to effectively play a role in governing specific city areas, but to do so they must incorporate 'bottom-up' governance. The city as commons is thus a system of governance over particular city spaces, which incorporates subsidiarity, or delegated authority, and polycentrism, meaning multiple parties are working together. population. 41 He recommended that the idea of the commons be reframed as a model that is not as "radically dissimilar from private property as one might suppose," 42 especially as the commons was historically considered exclusive under English law. 43 He argued that property had political weight, providing individuals and groups in the city with a language for "naming, governance. 47 Institutions are meant to protect and enhance shared resources in a city, 48 and land use regulations are seen as a way to improve utility or value within an urban landscape. To some scholars, the city government is the appropriate decision-maker. 49 Foster and Iaione argued that if local government does not manage the urban commons appropriately for whatever reason, "regulatory slippage" can occur, whereby the common resource is degraded in value or attractiveness for other types of users and uses. 50 They continued that at this point, the space in question "creates conditions which begin to mimic the type of commons problem that Hardin wrote about-that is, such resources become rivalrous and prone to degradation and perhaps 41 Nicholas Blomley, "Enclosure, common right, and the property of the poor" (2008) destruction." 51 The openness of many cityscapes yields social benefits but quickly mimics the conditions of a common pool resource of overuse in either volume or intensity. Put simply, the 'common pool resource' of the city may be owned by a variety of actors, with the governance of these actors as the more relevant discourse in a commons analysis.
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A third debate centres on how the interests of third parties are mediated. 53 There are more than two possible choices in maintaining the urban commons, not just government centralized regulation or privatization. There are alternative avenues for decision-making and management of the urban commons, such as those used for cooperative natural resource management regimes. 54 From this perspective, the city government may not act as an appropriate steward of city space, so some other form of governance can and should be invoked to limit the degradation of city resources. This is sometimes called 'bottom up governance' -making room for copartners, or co-collaborators who use and have a stake in the commons. 55 In other words, urban commons can be conceived as spaces with shared access to local resources for residents with a common stake in ensuring the longevity of a resource: a commons governance model that includes non-government actors can protect the 'common good.' 56 For example, non-state actors can get involved in a governance model when governments are too strained to address a broader range of city issues. 57 Clapp and Meyer use the commons framework to describe the governance practices of institutional actors with regard to the environment. 58 They questioned the ability of city governments to limit environmental depletion, due to existing municipal institutions of varying scales, regulatory structures, land markets, and state and local government policies and regulations. They argued that to ensure distributional equity, municipal institutions should allow communities to protect themselves from harm through the establishment of shared cooperative normative structures. In this way, governance beyond the state achieves a degree of fairness that is otherwise not possible. What is a Business Improvement District?
BIDs are self-taxed organizations that operate at the local level. They complicate notions of the urban commons. On one hand, they participate in governance in particular areas of the city as independent third parties. On the other hand, they are part of a city's local governance framework and are accountable to the city and the public. 62 Despite the emergence of these organizations internationally, no naming conventions or definitions have been standardized, 63 but BID is one common term. 64 A BID generally has three features: first, it provides a specific set of powers to business and property owners to achieve their mandate, most notably an organizational structure and direct access to the local councillors who serve on their boards. Second, it is funded through a required levy against local property owners or businesses, which functions as a form of disagree with its activities. Third, it supplements public services offered by the City, which more broadly defines their entrenched governance role. 65 The first BID worldwide was established in Toronto in 1970, and was called a "business improvement area." Toronto defines a business improvement areas as an association comprised of commercial and industrial property owners and business tenants within a specified geographic area district, which is officially approved by the City to stimulate business and improve economic vitality. 66 In the late 1960s, a small group of business leaders wanted to create a form of business association that would circumvent the 'free-rider problem,' whereby improvements by a small set of business owners would also advantage those who did not pay or otherwise contribute. They created an independent, privately managed organization with the power to impose an additional tax on all commercial property owners in the area to be directed to local revitalization initiatives, regardless of whether specific businesses individually agreed to form the BID. 67 Local business leaders believed that a stable and effective funding source would help with beautification and improvement, promote urban business areas, and ultimately allow them to regain market share. 68 This organizational form has not changed substantially in the following 45 years. 69 A long, complex process must be followed in order for City Council to pass a bylaw designating a BID, including a formal public consultation meeting and the polling of BID members. Municipal bylaws tell two conflicting stories about the legal status of BIDs. On one hand, they are defined as 'local boards' and are therefore subject to numerous operating requirements that include open meeting requirements and record keeping. The appointment of their members must follow the city's public appointments policy. Directors and board members, including the local city councillor, must conduct their affairs in compliance with all applicable law and City policies, which include privacy legislation, conflict of interest requirements, and the public appointments policy. 75 The requirements for creating a BIDs are detailed in the procedural bylaw and their funding is collected through the city's formal levying authorities and coordinated through an office dedicated to supporting their operations. The levy is drawn from local businesses and then forwarded to the BID when its annual budget is approved by City Council.
All members of the BID are legally obligated to pay the municipality their portion of the levy, Map 3: BIAs, neighbourhood associations, and income levels (Original research, 2016).
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In interviews I conducted for a larger project related to city governance, 83 one senior staff member at the City of Toronto explained that BIDs are "self-funding, defiant entities that operate in neighbourhoods, they're actually not really democratic. They're self-governing within the boundaries defined." 84 A former city councillor similarly referred to these organizations as "tiny little cities" within their areas. 85 The relevant laws reflect this account: once their creation is approved by City Council, BIDs operate largely independently, subject to having their budgets approved. Their boards make decisions on what activities and actions the BID will undertake, without review by city officials.
Evaluating BIDs: Relationship to city government, inclusivity, and representation 82 Original research (Name removed for review). 83 Note methodology 84 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk's Office, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 December 2015) -author conducted. 85 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) -author conducted.
BIDs have been described as "institutions that manage or govern common urban resources."
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Their role is critical to understanding how they fit within the meaning of the urban commons.
This section expands upon existing scholarship, focusing on the effects of BIDs in Toronto and elsewhere. Specifically, it explores three elements: the relationship of BIDs to city government, who they represent, and how they are accountable.
Relationship to city government
BIDs exacerbate the tension in the line between 'public' or 'private' governance. They are not simply private actors seeking additional power and do not fit easily within particular descriptions as exclusionary or inequality-enhancing: 87 they are complex organizations that defy easy categorization. 88 For example, some studies have found that BID administrators do not consider the organizations governmental institutions, but rather part of the private sector. 89 Wolf argued that BIDs are "a part of urban governance and public administration," 90 Previous research on BIDs in Toronto has revealed the difficulty in categorizing them. In his study of the development of the "creative city" within the Entertainment BID, Sébastien Darchen found that the BID had a strong voice in community deliberations and that its interests were specific to advantages for the member businesses. 101 While council ultimately supported a mixed-use neighbourhood with a more diverse range of economic activities than those proposed by the BID, Darchen concluded that the promotion of arts and culture as imagined by the BID led to revitalization of the area. 102 Another study of BIDs revealed that BIDs shape boundaries, market neighbourhoods, and affect governance overall. 103 The privileged role of BIDs in urban governance increases over time. A comprehensive study of BIDs in Center City, Pennsylvania evaluated the role of BIDs in urban governance. It revealed that BID directors play a profoundly important role in urban governance, and that their involvement in the city's governance became "deeper and wider" over the years. In particular, BID directors began to advocate on positions that went beyond the BID to citywide matters such as land-use planning, zoning, and intergovernmental funding for infrastructure repair. 104 This kind of organizational longevity appears to apply to Toronto as well: a study of Toronto's Downtown Yonge BID revealed that its objectives tended to evolve from basic operational and tactical tasks to more strategic tasks. 105 
Representation
Susanna Schaller and Gabriella Modan argued that BIDs fundamentally increase space-related tensions. 106 This tension is especially prevalent in economically and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, where they can have the same kinds of impacts as in communities being subject to gentrification. Schaller and Modan noted that, "In such neighborhoods, it is very often the case that the constituents who are marginalized from the public decision-making process are the same people who are most vulnerable to changes in the housing market. As rents and property taxes increase, the residents who were ostensibly to benefit from such innovations may be displaced from the neighborhood, and the democratic spaces of interaction where social networks are created and maintained may disappear." 107 Another study found that BIDs insulate development decisions from communities and neighbourhoods. 108 It also found that BIDs do not engage in neighbourhood advocacy or government-business relations, but instead focus on entertainment and high-rent housing, with minimal attention to the interests of existing residents, with "profound implications for notions of spatial and social justice." 109 Legal and anecdotal evidence suggests that BIDs make decisions that expressly undermine inclusivity. 110 A poignant example is Los Angeles, where four separate cases have been brought against the City and its BIDs for confiscating the property of homeless people, despite clear jurisprudence preventing this. 111 These unlawful seizures appeared to be random occurrences while homeless people were at missions and downtown shelters getting food and services, with items like tents, bedding, identification, and medications being seized. 112 A permanent injunction has been ordered against the City of Los Angeles, enjoining it not to confiscate and destroy personal property that does not appear abandoned without notice. 113 The plaintiffs allege that the City of Los Angeles "acts in concert with the BID to identify property to be removed and to ensure that the removals were not stopped or hindered." 114 In 2015, Toronto's Chinatown BID objected to a plan to introduce a youth homeless shelter within the boundaries of the BID. 115 The BID noted a lack of consultation on the proposal and possible negative effects on the area, stating: "the BID had worked hard for a decade to "clean up" the area, and business owners are worried the facility will turn Spadina into a "centre of homelessness." 116 The protest culminated in placards within member businesses, as well as a demonstration at City Hall.
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Representation is a major element of these space-based tensions, specifically in relation to the composition and mandates of BID boards. At present, residents have few, if any, representative votes on BID boards. 118 The board composition concentrates power among property and business owners, restricting the scope of representation. 119 This framework reinforces political dynamics that exclude marginalized and low-income residents, as well as small businesses. 120 Some scholars have advocated for changing the composition of BID boards. For example, Schaller and
Modan noted that individual claims over neighbourhood space are greatly influenced by immigration status, property ownership, class, and duration of residency in the community, and argued that city officials should ensure that any BID includes community members. 121 They argued that including neighbourhood residents would ultimately not lead to a shift in power away from businesses and property owners, because the other BID members would ultimately carry the most power.
Accountability
In this context, accountability refers to the degree to which BIDs operate with openness and fairness, and especially the degree to which they are subject to the same transparency and accountability requirements as other public bodies. 122 Briffault noted that BIDs are "autonomous, even though subjected to municipal oversight in theory." 123 He defined accountability in terms of reporting requirements to public officials, making a BID accountable to its board, the business community that it represents, city council, and the public. 124 City governments may implement measures such as annual reports, outside audits, and sunset and reauthorization requirements. The rationale for these mechanisms is to ensure continuous evaluation of BID performance and to give power to municipal governments if BIDs are overstepping their authorities, although others argue that they are pro forma and after the fact.
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In a popular newspaper, Ian Cook stated that BIDs may claim accountability to the public through their links to city council, but "ultimately BIDs are not really accountable to the public in general and are more focused on being 127 This 'success' ultimately allows BIDs to achieve their goals by eliminating the "messiness" of democracy, 128 and the price of this process
is to allow what has been conceived as "public" to become incrementally more "private." 129 One example is the accountability of BIDs in relation to public safety. 130 A study of street vendors in New York revealed the extent to which BIDs use strategies such as public realm design (e.g., planters), collaboration with police, surveillance techniques, and even harassment to limit street vending (which is largely illegal) within their boundaries. 131 These techniques are highly successful, and the landscape of street vending reflects the "decentralized, privatized and informalized vending management" of BIDs, rather than formal laws.
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The City of Toronto manages accountability issues through various laws and policies, principally This brief review of relevant literature related to governance shows that, in their existing design,
BIDs have significant decision-making power in local geographies of the city and represent BID members rather than the broader local public. Accountability provisions may not safeguard the effects of BID activities on the public, particularly the most vulnerable. BIDs may be viewed in two different ways: as an independent organization or as a formal actor in local governance.
What if BIDs could be conceptualized as one part of a broader commons?
BIDs and the urban commons framework
The legal and social problems identified in BID governance -representation, accountability, and an uncertain relationship with city governments -reflect the challenges of BIDs within a broader system of local governance. Ultimately, the interests of BIDs reflect those of a privileged subset that has considerable power in local governance without democratic legitimacy or strenuous accountability. Any discussion of the urban commons should include issues related to power: a BIDs deserve particular scrutiny in terms of their role within the urban commons framework. On one hand, they are woven into city administration through the existence of a dedicated office, an approved budget, and accessible information on how they may be contacted. This suggests that they are like any other local board of the City, with the responsibility to deliver a set of services and accountability with regard to how they use their funds. On the other hand, in local planning and other debates, they act as a privileged interest group to be consulted. This dual role creates confusion as to what role they serve (local boards or interest groups?) and to whom they are accountable (to the public or their members?). This confusion and narrow set of interests ultimately undermine the urban commons by depleting the 'common pool interest' -the democratic legitimacy of the local area.
The debates about the urban commons explored above -the site of the commons as the city as a whole or a smaller geographic area; whether the resource is owned or not; and how decisionmaking is mediated -illustrate the uneasy nesting of BIDs as an example of the urban commons.
The 'common pool resource' engaged in BIDs is the spatial area defined by city bylaws.
However, the spaces are not simply those that belong to business and property owners, but include 'public' areas like sidewalks and street furniture, and may include residential areas above or adjacent to storefronts. 139 Thus, the resource interest is shared among a diverse set of property holders: BID members, but also a broader range of residents and the public. Non-property owners have a stake in the area in question, however, these broader interests are not reflected in the BID governance model. 140 Moreover, this 'common pool resource' is also subject to many city policies and bylaws, with numerous other parties asserting interest in the same spaces, Understanding the BID as one player among many in urban governance reframes the BID as only one of many interests, with an urgent call for a more thoughtful, inclusive, and representative local governance model. City governments, and especially councillors, must acknowledge the narrow interests that BIDs represent by reducing the extent to which they can exert decision-making power. This would help achieve Gerald Frug's vision for a healthy community, "transformed from a concrete source of normative regulation to a loose confederation joined by common symbols, sights, and spaces, an artifact of subjective identification rather than tightly bounded common experiences."
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Conclusion
The urban commons is not merely about rights and who has what interest in the standard 'bundle' language that property law asserts. In a city, it is also about a meaningful governance model that permits residents, businesses' and other key stakeholders to have a say and a role over what happens in local spaces. This conception of the urban commons causes conflict when considered in relation to BIDs, which have a conflicting identity as both an independent organization and as part of the city's governance framework. This paper advances that, instead of 
